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ABSTRACT 
 
This study estimates default probabilities of 124 emerging countries from 1981-2002 as a function of a set 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Major international banks and international investors use risk neutral default probabilities in pricing 
models for bonds and loans as well as real world default probabilities as an input to their credit risk 
management models to determine country risk exposure limits. According to the new version of the Basel 
Capital Accord – Basel II (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004), banks are allowed to use 
their internal ratings, credit ratings from rating agencies and their associated default rates in determining 
their required regulatory capital against credit risk. Thus, the ratings from rating agencies are important 
for international capital allocation. However, as examined in this study, default probabilities from rating 
agencies may not be adequate proxies for sovereign default probabilities.  
 
This study utilizes models specifically developed for assessing sovereign default risk based on a sample 
of 124 emerging countries over the period 1981-2002. This study therefore covers recent period for an 
extended group of countries, as majority of the studies in the area focus on more limited samples. The 
models that we use for assessing probabilities of default are typical for these types of studies, however, 
they are further enhanced by use of Principal Component Analysis in identifying the main forecasting 
variables. The models are explained and tested in detail in Georgievska et al. (2005). 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether sovereign default/rescheduling probabilities derived from 
our models, which are specifically designed for sovereigns, are more appropriate measures of probability 
of sovereign default than credit agencies’ default rates. The study, therefore, compares the estimated 
probabilities from our models with the assigned credit rating probabilities of three major international 
rating agencies, namely, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch. The main incremental 
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contribution of this paper is therefore to compare the accuracy of determining default rate probabilities 
using our best forecasting models versus the ones provided by credit rating agencies1.    
 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The literature on sovereign debt suggest that a number of macroeconomic, political and capital markets 
factors influence the probability of a country's sovereign debt repayment difficulties. Sovereign default 
may either be triggered by countries' 'unwillingness' to repay their external debts or by countries 'inability' 
to repay their external debts due to insolvency or illiquidity. Thus, a country's solvency or the country's 
stock of debt in relation to the country's ability to pay can be measured by the GDP, government revenues 
or exports. If the discounted value of future trade balances exceeds the current external debt stock we can 
say that the country is solvent (e.g., Roubini, 2001). Subsequently, the exchange rate regime plays a role 
in the country's solvency since an overvaluation may lead to external imbalances that lead to debt 
accumulation. Moreover, theory suggests that the openness2 can affect the country's willingness to default 
since the costs of default are affected (e.g., Eaton and Fernandez, 1995). Macroeconomic stability affects 
the risk attitudes of investors; e.g. high inflation and high money growth deter investors from a country. 
Illiquidity can also cause sovereign default, which is usually measured by the short-term debt to reserves 
or M2 to reserves. Finally, political and institutional factors can cause sovereign default since they affect 
the credibility of a country's policies and government willingness to adopt a sustainable debt strategy 
(e.g., Hemming and Petrie, 2002 and Hemming and Chalk, 2000). 
 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this study we have selected two out of four forecasting models developed in our previous study 
based on their superior level of forecasting ability. In addition, we have adjusted the data sample to match the 
country coverage with credit rating agencies for comparison purposes – reducing the sample from 127 to 124 
emerging economies.  
2
 The higher the imports in relation to the size of the economy the more open is the country, thus more vulnerable to 
foreign shocks, and more likely to external debt rescheduling (e.g., Frenkel, 1983) 
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A number of econometric studies, which mainly used panel logit and probit analysis, developed models 
that predict rescheduling/default events with a high degree of accuracy. In such models, the dependent 
variable is transformed into the probability of an event, which in our case, is the event of rescheduling; 
see also Rivoli and Brewer (1997). The period analysed by key studies in the area mainly covers early 
1970s to 1990s, except for Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2000) which covered the period from 1971-
1998.  
 
All empirical studies specify the dependent variable as a binary outcome that can take the value of 1 in 
the case of defaulting (rescheduling) and 0 in the case of non-defaulting (non-rescheduling) event. The 
empirical studies differ in defining what constitutes a default or rescheduling event3.  
 
A small number of explanatory variables are found to be systematically significant in most of the studies 
performed. Three financial ratios have been most often tested and found most consistently significant: 
reserves to imports (e.g., Aylward and Thorne, 1998); total external debt to GDP (e.g., Balkan, 1992, 
Detragiache and Spilmbergo, 2000 etc.); and total debt service payment to exports (e.g., Solberg, 1988 
and Rivoli and Brewer, 1997). Some macroeconomic and policy variables such as GDP growth, inflation 
and indicators of exchange rate overvaluation, are found to have a significant effect on country’s ability to 
repay its debts in some studies, but are insignificant in others. A number of studies have tested the 
significance of the past repayment records and lagged rescheduling events, as an explanatory variable for 
a country’s current repayment behaviour. All those studies, such as Hajivasiliou (1987, 1989 and 1994), 
Solberg (1988) and McFadden et al. (1985) found that a country’s historical debt servicing performance 
has a significant impact on its current repayment performance. Finally, political factors even though 
                                                 
3
 Some studies define a country as in default if there is a debt rescheduling agreement or negotiations. Other studies 
consider sovereign default if there are arrears on principal or interest payments, or a country concludes an upper-
tranche IMF agreement. 
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found important (e.g., Citron and Nickelsburg, 1987) have been included in only a few studies mainly due 
to scarcity of data4. Some studies such as Schwartz and Zurita (1992), and Lee (1991) tried to differentiate 
between a country’s ‘ability’ to service its debts and its ‘willingness’ to do so by using macroeconomic 
and political proxies, but due to limitations in political variables data, most of the results obtained are 
insignificant.  
 
Other variables suggested to be used in modelling sovereign debt re-scheduling are: loan demand and 
supply measured through international reserves, current account and debt service due as in McFadden et 
al. (1985) and Hajivassiliou (1989) which have not been found consistently significant; credit ratings for 
sovereign defaults and currency crises as in Reinhart (2002) and Rojaz-Suarez (2001) which exhibit poor 
predictive power; and debt ratios as in Berg and Sachs (1998) which yield more consistent results in 
explaining the differences in the repayment performance by countries.  
 
Data limitations have prevented the close examination of predictive power of sovereign spreads for 
sovereign defaults. The data for sovereign spreads became available during the 1990s when the debts of 
commercial banks were securitized and converted into Bradies and Eurobonds that were easily traded. 
However, most of the debt defaults occurred in the 1980s when spreads data were not available. A study 
performed by Dell'Ariccia et al. (2002) suggested that spreads are affected by moral hazard, since the 
spreads increased after the Russian non-bailout in 1998. 
 
From the existing empirical studies on sovereign defaults reviewed in greater detail in Georgievska et al. 
(2005), the variables that explain sovereign defaults can be classified into five groups: (1) Solvency 
                                                 
4
 Examples of political variables used in some studies are: democracy index, political instability index, long- and 
short-term armed conflict, changes of the finance minister and/or the minister of the economy  
Sovereign Debt Rescheduling  
 6 
variables5; (2) Liquidity Variables6; (3) Variables used in currency crises models7; (4) Macroeconomic 
control variables8; and (5) Political variables9.    
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION 
3.1 Dependent Variable – Rescheduling Event 
In common with most of the previous studies we define a rescheduling ‘event’ as occurring in the year a 
rescheduling agreement is finalized. Our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that is binary-
valued in the sample i.e.  
               01itngRescheduli  
The value 1 or 0 in the above formulation is determined by using the 'total amounts of debt rescheduled’ 
(TADR) figure in US dollars obtained from the World Bank Global Development Finance 2004. This 
does not distinguish between multilateral, bilateral or private creditors in different years, but our 
main interest is in the event of rescheduling, regardless of the type of debt involved. If a country i 
has a TADR bigger than zero in time period t, we consider that as rescheduling event, i.e. assign a value 
of ‘1’ to this observation in time period t.  
 
                                                 
5
 Private or official debt in relation to the capacity of repayment. 
6
 External debt service/reserves or External debt service/exports. 
7
 E.g. Money/Gross International reserves, Exchange rate devaluation, as per IMF research. 
8
 Real growth, exchange rate, inflation etc. 
9
 Variables that explain the country's 'willingness to pay', e.g.  government stability, socioeconomic conditions, 
external conflict, internal conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, democratic accountability etc. 
if country i reschedules its external debt in year t 
if country i does not reschedule its external debt in year t 
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3.2 Explanatory Variables 
We originally started our analysis with 35 potential independent variables, as identified in the literature. 
However, since such a large volume of the data can cause over-fitting in the model and multicolinearity, 
we performed a principal component analysis (as described in section 3.5.) in order to reduce the 
dimension of our data. We selected the most important variables that fulfil the following criteria: (1) the 
variables are individually and jointly significant in the econometric model; (2) the coefficients on the 
variables included in the model show their expected sign; and (3) the variables included optimize the fit 
of the model. The following eight variables generated the best fit for our models (Appendix 1 provides a 
table of the variables used): 
(1) Solvency Variables: Total Debt/GNP; Arrears/Exports; Exports/GDP  
(2) Liquidity Variable: International Reserves/GDP  
(3) Macroeconomic Variables: Current Account Balance/GDP; Imports/GDP; 
(4) Political Variable: ICRG Composite Index Rating. ICRG composite index is produced by PRS 
Group. It is comprised of the following indicators: 50% political risk, 25% financial risk, and 
25% economic risk10. 
We also included the lagged dependent variable (rescheduling event) as an explanatory variable to reflect 
the past repayment performance of a country.  
 
3.3 Sample and Data 
The study focuses on 124 emerging countries over the period 1981-2002. Appendix 2 lists the countries 
included in our analysis, the period examined for each country, and the rescheduling observations for 
each country. Data on external debt and amounts rescheduled are from Global Development Finance 
                                                 
10
 The cost of obtaining and processing this information is marginal providing the analytical set up in a financial 
institution is already in place.  For lower net worth individual investors there may be a cost advantage of utilizing 
the existing credit rating agencies’ default probabilities.  
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2004 CD-ROM. Data on economic variables used in the study are from various sources: World 
Development Indicators 1999 and 2004 CD-ROMs, World Bank Global Development Finance Country 
Tables from 1998-2004, IMF (IFS) International Financial Statistics, and various OECD publications. 
Data on political risk indicators are obtained from various issues of International Country Risk Guide 
published by PRS (Political Risk Services) Group. Our final sample contains 1380 observations. All 
explanatory variables used in the econometric model are lagged by 1 year to reduce the problem of 
endogeneity. While economic and political variables exert pressure on debt rescheduling probabilities at 
the same time they may also be a consequence of it.  
 
3.5 Principal Component Analysis – PCA 
The reason for performing the PCA is to find the most parsimonious set of variables to include in our 
analysis, as well as to identify the interrelationships among the variables. For example, variables 
discovered to be highly correlated and members of the same factor (component) will be expected to have 
similar profiles. Our objective is to reduce most of the original information into a small number of factors 
for prediction purposes. PCA takes into account the total variance and derives factors that contain small 
proportions of unique variance and error variance. The primary reason for choosing a PCA analysis rather 
than other factor analysis is because PCA is more appropriate when the primary concern is about 
prediction or finding the minimum number of factors needed to account for the maximum portion of the 
variance represented in the original set of variables (e.g., Hair et al., 2003). PCA results suggest that we 
can identify ten dimensions (components) in our data, and we have selected no more than two to three 
variables from each of those dimensions to include in the model. We believe those are sufficient for 
explaining the whole dimension.11  
                                                 
11
 The PCA analysis is presented and discussed in detail in Georgievska et al. 2005. 
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3.6 The Model 
We are using panel logit models developed in Georgievska et al. (2005) in order to estimate the sovereign 
rescheduling probabilities of 124 emerging market countries as a function of a number of variables. The 
panel logit model is a binary choice model that can be explained in the following manner: 
 
Consider a sovereign country i observed over T periods of time, where t = 1,….,T and i = 1,…,N. For this 
sovereign country there exists an unobservable random variable y*it indicating whether a country 
reschedules its sovereign debt in a year t. y*it is a function of lagged explanatory variables Xit, constant 
unobserved individual country effects α and random error term uit. The use of only lagged explanatory 
variables is for the purpose of avoiding simultaneity effects and to reflect direct causation. The following 
equation represents the above 
y*it = α + b' Xit + uit     (1) 
y*i is a dummy variable defined by 
  otherwise      0 0 if     1 i*yiy*  
 
b is a (k x 1) vector of parameters, and the error terms  itu  are independent and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.) with zero mean and unit variance, and follows a logistic distribution. αi  represents the unobserved 
country specific characteristics.  
 
The core equation or the probability that a sovereign i will reschedule its debt at time t can be represented 
as follows: 
)exp(1
)exp()1(Prob
it
it
it α
α
Xβ'
Xβ' ngRescheduli    (2) 
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where 
3
α  and bβ
3
 , which can be estimated through the maximization of the likelihood 
function and through iteration solving for the parameters (e.g. Greene, 2003).  
 
 
 
4. RESULTS  
In this study we utilise two models for our analysis because Model A maximises percent correct 
classifications and Model B minimises type I error. Model A attempts to use variables identified as 
significant in various component dimensions from PCA, which should provide us with a model of 
sovereign debt that has a large percentage of correct classifications, i.e. a well-fitted model. Model B 
considers the most relevant and significant variables obtained from Model A, and a model which uses at 
least one variable from each component identified by PCA. Model B also assesses the importance of a 
political variable in determining the probability of sovereign rescheduling. Table 1 shows the results of 
Model A and Model B.  
Both Model A and Model B give us estimates of rescheduling probabilities that are going to be used for 
our further comparisons with the probabilities assigned by international rating agencies, i.e., Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch, as described in section 5.   
 
In Model A, the most significant variables are the lagged dependent variable (rescheduling event) and the 
total debt/GNP. However, the coefficients obtained by the model are not the marginal effects since the 
logit model is non-linear and these coefficients do not assign any economic meaning to the variable. 
Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the independent variables except for the 
dummy lagged rescheduling variable where the marginal effect is calculated for discrete change 
from 0 to 1. Marginal effects measure the change in the expected value of y as one independent variable 
increases by unity while all other variables are kept constant. For continuous variables, marginal effects at 
mean (MEM) are calculated as: 
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MEM = )( xfi   
Where β_ x denotes the linear combination of parameters and variables, f( x ) is the derivative of F(β_ x)12 
with respect to β_ x. 
 
 
When assessing marginal effects, we can observe that the current account balance/GDP ratio has the 
greatest economic importance. A one unit increase in current account balance/GDP will result in a 4.44% 
increase in the probability of rescheduling/default. Therefore, in economic terms, if a country experiences 
a large current account deficit this will induce the problem of servicing maturing debt if there is a shock 
that will disturb the country from accessing the international lending market. Two other variables with 
economic relevance are lagged dependent variable and international reserves/GDP with 2.14% and -
2.68% marginal effects respectively. The remaining variables have considerably lower economic 
importance. 
 
In Model B, the ICRG composite index, which is the proxy political risk factor included in this model, is 
significant at 5% level. According to the marginal effects, however, this is the most significant variable in 
economic terms. A one unit increment in the country's risk (one unit increase in ICRG) will result in a 
3.78% decrease in the country's probability of rescheduling13.  
 
Comparing Model A and Model B presented in Table 1, one can observe that Model A has a higher 
percentage of correct classifications. However, taking into consideration type I and II errors neither of the 
two models outperforms since Model A outperforms in terms of type II error and under-performs in terms 
                                                 
12
 F(βx) is the cumulative distribution function 
13Similarly, Balkan (1992) finds the political factors and proxies of political factors very significant variables in 
explaining a country's rescheduling/default and the country's risk exposure faced by international lenders.   
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of type I error or vice versa. Thus, we can not simply choose a model by comparing the type I and II 
errors. However, since type I error and percent correct predictions are important mostly for international 
lenders, the model that maximizes the percentage correct predictions and minimizes the type I error would 
be preferred. Table 1 suggests that Model A maximizes the percent correct classifications but Model B 
minimizes the type I error better than Model A. Thus, estimated rescheduling probabilities from both 
Model A and Model B are going to be used for our further comparisons with the probabilities assigned by 
international rating agencies.  
-- Insert Table 1 here -- 
 
5. ESTIMATED MODELS’ RESCHEDULING PROBABILITIES VS RATING AGENCIES’ 
DEFAULT RATES 
5.1 Sovereign Credit Ratings and Default Probabilities 
The one year default/rescheduling probabilities estimated from Model A and Model B can be indirectly 
compared to the one year long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings from three leading  credit 
rating agencies (CRAs) - Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch Ratings. Moody’s sovereign rating 
system is mainly based on the default risk for medium and long term foreign currency debt obligations 
issued by a national government (Moody's Investor Service, 1995). Standard and Poor's uses a similar 
rating system mainly based on each government’s capacity and willingness to repay its foreign currency 
debt according to its terms (Standard and Poor's, 1997). Fitch’s ratings specifically track sovereign 
defaults (Fitch Ratings, 2002). Default/rescheduling probabilities obtained in Model A and Model B can 
not be directly compared to the letter ratings ranging from AAA (Aaa for Moody's, AAA for S&P's) to C 
by these rating agencies. Thus, a way to overcome this is to transform the letter ratings with their 
associated one-year cumulative default probabilities or ranges of default probabilities when appropriate.  
 
Appendix 3 presents Moody's, S&P's, and Fitch’s rating scales together with their most recent (2002) 
associated 1-year default probabilities. All three rating agencies compile 1-year cumulative default rates’ 
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data associated with their letter ratings tracking periods of up to 20 years. For instance, the average 1-year 
cumulative default rate associated with a rating grade of B2 (Moody's) is 6.81%, which is the historical 
number of obligors that defaulted within one year of being assigned a B2 rating grade expressed as a 
percentage of total number of countries and companies with B2 rating over the same one year period. 
 
Moreover, most major banks use credit ratings and their associated default probabilities to feed their 
credit risk management models, to price bonds and loans, and to determine their country exposure limits. 
According to the current version of the new international capital adequacy framework, commonly known 
as Basel II, banks are allowed to use internal rating models and associated default rates (mainly based on 
credit ratings by CRAs) to determine their required regulatory capital needed against credit risk exposure 
(Basel Committee, 2004). Thus, credit ratings play an important role in the international capital 
allocation. However, the central issue is that the sovereign credit ratings of emerging markets are mainly 
based on corporate defaults since rating agencies have very little data on sovereign defaults. The reason is 
that very few sovereigns have defaulted since World War II when many rating agencies started collecting 
relevant data (e.g., Haque et al., 1998). Therefore, rating agencies are faced with population problem for 
sovereigns.  
 
Nevertheless, a most common practice by banks is to use corporate default rates as representatives for 
sovereign default rates. However, these are fundamentally different borrowers in terms of legal status as 
well as in terms of “solvency”. Thus, such an assumption seems doubtful. Therefore, the purpose of this 
section is to examine whether sovereign default/rescheduling probabilities derived from models 
specifically designed for sovereigns, such as Model A and Model B in this study, are more appropriate 
measures of likelihood of sovereign default than rating agencies’ corporate default rates.    
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5.2 Comparison of default/rescheduling probabilities in year 2002 
Table 2 summarizes default/rescheduling probabilities derived from Model A and Model B along with 
default probabilities obtained from Moody's, S&P's, and Fitch’s ratings for 42 countries that were rated at 
the beginning of 2002. From the 37 countries rated by Moody's, 35 (95.59%) had lower 1-year cumulative 
default rates than the estimated country 1-year default probabilities from Model A and 36 (97.30%) had 
lower 1-year cumulative default rates than those estimated from Model B. From the 35 countries rated by 
Standard and Poor's, 30 (85.71%) of them had generally lower 1-year cumulative default rates than Model 
A estimated default probabilities while 31 (88.57%) had lower 1-year default rates than Model B 
estimated 1-year default probabilities. Additionally, from the 27 countries rated by Fitch, 26 (96.3%) had 
lower 1-year cumulative default rates than Model A predicted ones and 25 (92.59%) had lower 1-year 
cumulative default rates than Model B estimated default probabilities.   
 
Of particular interest are the results obtained for Bolivia, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Russia as those countries actually rescheduled/defaulted in 2002.  For all these 
countries, the implied default rates from their ratings at the beginning of 2002 seem too optimistic. 
Indeed, the Model A and Model B estimated default probabilities were all high (most of them above 
50%), indicating rescheduling, but their default probabilities assigned by the agencies were very low, 
mainly below 10% (with exception to Indonesia’s and Pakistan’s Fitch rating of up to 100% default rate 
where Indonesia actually defaulted). This indicates that rating agencies largely lagged or were not 
effective in predicting rescheduling/default in 2002. In particular, for Russia, Model A and Model B 
predict high default probabilities of 61.73% and 55.17% respectively when Russia actually defaulted, 
while Moody's, S&P's, and Fitch, predicted only 1.58%, 2.63-3.33%, and 1.55-1.68% default rates 
respectively.  
 
An interesting exceptional case to our general result is Argentina, where both Model A and Model B as 
well as the Moody's and S&P's default rates indicate a high possibility of default (mainly above 50%) but 
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Argentina actually did not default in 2002. Only Fitch's low default probability of 1.55 – 1.68% was 
actually correct in assessing Argentina’s non-default in 2002. This is because our models’ and the 
Moody's and S&P's default rates were largely influenced by Argentina's previous year’s (November 
2001) default.   
-- Insert Table 2 here -- 
 
These results overall indicate that rating agencies' default rates largely underestimate sovereign default 
risk over one year horizon. This is because rating agencies' default rates are mainly based on historical 
corporate default rates (with the exception of Fitch’s rating specially tracking sovereign defaults). This 
finding is consistent with the common observation that emerging market sovereign bonds usually trade at 
much higher yield spreads than similarly rated US corporate bonds14. One interpretation is that emerging 
market sovereigns usually exhibit higher default probabilities than US corporates. Another interpretation 
is simply that rating agencies' sovereign ratings are generally too optimistic. This implies that corporate 
rating grades and their associated default probabilities generally do not appear to be good proxies for 
sovereign default probabilities.  
 
A systematic underestimation of sovereign default risk might lead to underestimation of credit risk for 
banks, hence under-pricing of sovereign bonds and loans and excessive capital inflows to underestimated 
countries. Subsequently, unexpected global or country specific shocks such as unexpected policy shift 
(default) might trigger reassessment of the effective market and credit risks involved and ratings may 
quickly be downgraded. At that point, international investors (banks) will struggle to decrease their 
exposure in these, now more risky, countries. Consequently, following this process, a vicious circle may 
develop as capital outflows incur deteriorating country fundamentals, thus leading to more rating 
                                                 
14
 International Monetary Fund, 2000 
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downgrading, resulting in a self-fulfilling crisis (see e.g. Hutchison and Neubetger (2001), Goldstein et al. 
(2000) for further details).  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
A comparison of the estimated sovereign default/rescheduling probabilities as per our models with the 
default rates associated to the sovereign credit ratings of three leading rating agencies, namely, Moody's, 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, provide insights into the adequacy and the applicability of sovereign credit 
ratings for international investors.  
 
The results from the comparison between our modelled rescheduling/default probabilities and the 
Moody's, S&P's, and Fitch's associated default rates, yield conclusions in two main areas. Firstly, on an 
empirical level, it appears that rating agencies' default rates considerably underestimate sovereign default 
probabilities. Thus, rating agencies' sovereign default rankings usually lag in predicting 
defaults/rescheduling. Secondly, on a theoretical level, consistent underestimation of default rates by 
rating agencies might lead banks and other international investor to put excessive capital inflows in risky 
countries and to underestimate their risk exposure. So when a debt default occurs, this might lead to 
excessive capital outflows from those countries resulting in acceleration and deepening of the crisis.  
 
One recommendation for further research is an analysis of whether rating agencies consistently 
underestimate emerging countries' default risk and if so whether such systematic underestimation leads to 
self-fulfilling debt crises.  
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APPENDIX 1 –Codes of Variables Used in the Study  
 
Variables Codes and Their Description: 
 
Variable Code Variable Code 
Lagged Rescheduling L_rsch 
Inflation rate (consumer 
prices) L_inflcons 
Total Debt/GNP L_tdgnp Inflation rate (GDP deflator) L_infldefl 
ICRG Rating Assigned L_icrgrating Devaluation of Exchange rate L_exchdev 
Total Debt/Exports L_tdexp 
Interest arrears on 
LDOD/Exports L_iaexp 
Short-term Debt/Total Debt L_sdtd 
Principal arrears on 
LDOD/Exports L_paexp 
Interest Service due/Exports L_isexp Interest arrears on LDOD/Debt L_iad 
PNG, total private 
nonguaranteed/Exports L_pngexp 
Principal arrears on 
LDOD/Debt L_pad 
PPG, official creditors/Exports L_ppgoexp Domestic Saving Rate L_dsr 
PPG, total public and publicly 
guaranteed/Exports L_ppgexp Government Expenditure/GDP L_gegdp 
Debt Service due/Exports L_dsexp 
US 1-YEAR US DEP. 
LONDON OFFER L_uslibor 
Reserves/Imports L_resexp 
UK 3-MONTH LIBOR:OFFER 
PARIS L_uklibor 
Exports/GDP L_expgdp 
IMF RATE 0F 
REMUNERATION L_imfremr 
Imports/GDP L_impgdp IMF SDR INTEREST RATE L_imfsdrr 
Current Account Balance/GDP L_cargdp 
IC CHANGES IN CONSUMER 
PRICES L_icppi 
International Reserves/GDP L_iresgdp 
OECD CHANGES IN 
CONSUMER PRICES L_oecdcpi 
Credit to private sector/GDP L_cpsgdp   
Log GDP per capita (constant 
1995 $US) L_logGDPPC   
GDP per capita growth(constant 
1995 $US) L_gdppcg95   
GDP growth rate L_gdpgr   
Exports growth rate L_expgr   
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APPENDIX 2 – Sample and Data 
 
 
Table 3: Sample and Data 
Country 
Period 
Examined 
Reschedulings 
during the 
period   Country 
Period 
Examined 
Reschedulings 
during the 
period   Country 
Period 
Examined 
Reschedulings 
during the 
period 
    
       
Albania 1993-2002 5  Georgia 1998-2002 2 
 
Paraguay 1990-2002 1 
Algeria 1990-2002 6  Ghana 1990-2002 3 
 
Peru 1990-2002 10 
Angola 1990-2002 7  Grenada 1990-2002 0 
 
Philippines 1981-2002 10 
Argentina 1990-2002 9  Guatemala 1990-2002 3 
 
Poland 1991-2002 5 
Armenia 1994-2002 4  Guinea 1990-2002 9 
 
Romania 1991-2002 0 
Azerbaijan 1994-2002 1  Guinea-Bissau 1990-1997 8 
 
Russian Federati 1995-2002 8 
Bangladesh 1990-2002 0  Guyana 1993-2002 6 
 
Rwanda 1990-2002 5 
Belarus 1994-2002 3  Haiti 1990-2002 2 
 
Samoa 1990-2002 0 
Belize 1990-2002 1  Honduras 1990-2002 12 
 
Sao Tome and Pri 1990-2002 7 
Benin 1990-2002 10  Hungary 1990-2002 0 
 
Senegal 1990-2002 11 
Bhutan 1990-2002 0  India 1990-2002 0 
 
Seychelles 1990-2002 0 
Bolivia 1990-2002 9  Indonesia 1990-2002 4 
 
Sierra Leone 1990-2002 8 
Botswana 1990-2002 0  Iran, Islamic Re 1990-2002 4 
 
Slovak Republic 1994-2002 0 
Brazil 1990-2002 9  Jamaica 1990-2002 7 
 
Solomon Islands 1990-2002 1 
Bulgaria 1992-2002 6  Jordan 1990-2002 12 
 
South Africa 1995-2002 1 
Burkina Faso 1990-2002 8  Kazakhstan 1996-2002 2 
 
Sri Lanka 1990-2002 0 
Burundi 1990-2002 1  Kenya 1990-2002 4 
 
St. Kitts and Ne 1990-2002 0 
Cambodia 1994-2002 3  Kyrgyz Republic 1994-2002 6 
 
St. Lucia 1990-2002 0 
Cameroon 1990-2002 11  Lao PDR 1990-2002 1 
 
St. Vincent and 1990-2002 0 
Cape Verde 1990-2002 3  Latvia 1994-2002 0 
 
Sudan 1990-2002 0 
Central African 1990-2002 8  Lebanon 1990-2002 0 
 
Swaziland 1990-2002 0 
Chad 1990-2002 9  Lesotho 1990-2002 0 
 
Syrian Arab Repu 1990-2002 1 
Chile 1990-2002 4  Lithuania 1994-2002 0 
 
Tajikistan 1998-2002 4 
China 1990-2002 0  Macedonia, FYR 1997-2002 3 
 
Tanzania 1990-2002 12 
Colombia 1990-2002 1  Madagascar 1990-2002 7 
 
Thailand 1990-2002 0 
Comoros 1990-2002 5  Malawi 1990-2002 2 
 
Togo 1990-2002 11 
Congo, Rep. 1990-2002 11  Malaysia 1990-2002 0 
 
Tonga 1990-2002 0 
Costa Rica 1990-2002 5  Maldives 1990-2002 0 
 
Trinidad and Tob 1990-2002 4 
Cote d'Ivoire 1990-2002 12  Mali 1990-2002 7 
 
Tunisia 1990-2002 0 
Croatia 1994-2002 4  Mauritius 1990-2002 0 
 
Turkey 1990-2002 0 
Czech Republic 1994-2002 0  Mexico 1990-2002 5 
 
Turkmenistan 1994-1998 0 
Dominica 1990-2002 0  Moldova 1995-2002 3 
 
Uganda 1990-2002 9 
Dominican Republ 1990-2002 10  Mongolia 1994-2002 0 
 
Ukraine 1995-2002 6 
Ecuador 1990-2002 10  Morocco 1990-2002 5 
 
Uruguay 1990-2002 2 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1990-2002 10  Mozambique 1990-2002 11 
 
Uzbekistan 1996-2002 1 
El Salvador 1990-2002 4  Nepal 1990-2002 0 
 
Vanuatu 1990-2002 0 
Equatorial Guine 1990-2002 1  Nicaragua 1990-2002 13 
 
Venezuela, RB 1990-2002 1 
Eritrea 1999-2002 0  Niger 1990-2002 12 
 
Vietnam 1997-2002 4 
Estonia 1994-2002 0  Nigeria 1990-2002 6 
 
Yemen, Rep. 1991-2002 7 
Ethiopia 1990-2002 8  Oman 1990-2002 0 
 
Zambia 1990-2002 12 
Fiji 1990-2002 0  Pakistan 1990-2002 3 
 
Zimbabwe 1990-2002 0 
Gabon 1990-2002 12  Panama 1990-2002 6 
 
   
Gambia, The 1990-2002 0   Papua New Guinea 1990-2002 0 
  Total 1981-2002 519 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table 4: Average 1-Year Cumulative Default Rates by Letter Rating 
Moody's Investor Services, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch Ratings 
      
Moody's 
Ratings 
Moody's Average 1-
Year Cumulative 
Default Rates (%) * 
Standard 
and Poor's 
Ratings 
Standard and Poor's 
Average 1-Year 
Cummulative Default 
Rates (%) ** 
Fitch 
Ratings 
Fitch's Average 1-Year 
Cumulative Default 
Rates (%) *** 
Aaa 0.00% AAA 0.00% AAA 0.00% 
A1 0.00% AA+ 0.00% AA+ 0.00% 
A3 0.43% AA 0.00% AA 0.00% 
Baa1 1.26% AA- 0.00% AA- 0.00 - 0.05% 
Baa2 0.73% A+ 0.00% A+ 0.00 - 0.05% 
Baa3 1.78% A 0.00% A 0.05% 
Ba1 1.58% A- 0.00% A- 0.05 - 0.36% 
Ba2 1.41% BBB+ 0.00% BBB+ 0.05 - 0.36% 
Ba3 1.58% BBB 0.00% BBB 0.36% 
B1 2.00% BBB- 0.00 - 2.63% BBB- 0.36 - 1.94% 
B2 6.81% BB+ 0.00 - 2.63% BB+ 0.36 - 1.94% 
B3 6.86% BB 2.63% BB 1.94% 
Caa1 13.95% BB- 2.63 - 3.33% BB- 1.94 - 2.54% 
Caa2 33.93% B+ 2.63 - 3.33% B+ 1.94 - 2.54% 
Caa3 30.59% B 3.33% B 2.54% 
Ca 50.00% B- 3.33 - 100% B- 2.54 - 26.53% 
C 40.00% CCC-C 100.00% CCC-C 26.53% 
* Moody's Investors Service, 2003, "Default & Recovery Rates of Corporate Bond Issuers: A Statistical Review of Moody's Ratings 
Performance, 1920-2002", Special Comment, February (New York, Moody's Investor Service)  
** Standard and Poor's , 2002, "Sovereign Ratings 2001:The Best of Times, The Worst of Times", Sovereigns, April (New York, Standard 
and Poor's) 
*** Fitch Ratings, 2002, "Fitch Corporate Finance 2002 Rating Migration and Default Study", Corporate Finance, (New York, Fitch 
Ratings) 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Estimation Results  
 Dependent variable 
 - Rescheduling  
  
Model A Model B 
(5)  (6) (7)  (8) 
Coef  
Marginal 
Effects 
% Coef  
Marginal 
Effects 
% 
Variable (z-stat)   (dy/dx) (z-stat)   (dy/dx) 
           
   l_rsch 8.4674 *** 2.1362 10.1028 *** 2.3128 
  
(10.21)    (10.07)   
   l_tdgnp 5.9149 *** 1.7775 4.5033 *** 1.5048 
  
(6.62)    (4.88)   
   l_icrgrating      0.0228 ** -3.7790 
  
     (-3.16)   
   l_iaexp      0.5933 * -0.5220 
  
     (-1.98)   
   l_impgdp      0.1745 ** -1.7459 
  
     (-2.65)   
   l_expgdp 0.1815 ** -1.7065     
  
(-2.74)        
   l_cargdp 84.4973 ** 4.4367     
  
(3.15)        
   l_gdpgr         
  
         
   l_iresgdp 0.0689 * -2.6750     
  
(-2.1)        
  
         
Constant -2.0439 ***  0.3026   
Sigma_u 1.0222   0.7966   
σ2u cons 0.0438   -0.4547   
  
         
Log-Likelihood 
  -526.31     -418.79  
LR Statistic (degrees of 
freedom) 
  
(5) 
222.79     
(5) 
215.75  
P-value of LR stat 
  0.0000     0.0000  
Model Chi-Squared 
  231.12     207.8  
  
         
Cut off point 
  0.45     0.475  
Correct Classifications 
(%) 
  82.68     82.54  
Type I Error (%) 
  9.13     8.33  
Type II Error (%) 
  8.19     9.13  
  
         
No. of Observations   1380     1008  
No. of Countries 
Analysed   124     91  
Period Analysed   
1981-
2002     
1981-
2002   
*significant at 10% level of significance 
**significant at 5% level of significance 
***significant at 1% level of significance
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Table 2: Model A and Model B 1-Year Default/Reschediling Probabilities vs. Rating Agencies' 1-Year Default Rate in 2002 
(42 Emerging Countries rated by Moody's, S&P's, and Fitch) 
           
 
NO. Country 
Actual 
Rescheduling 
Model A 
Predicted 
Default 
Probabilities 
Model B 
Predicted 
Default 
Probabilities 
Moody's 
associated 1-
Year Default 
Probability (%) 
beginning 2002 
S&P's 
associated 1-
Year Default 
Probability (%) 
end 2001 
Fitch's 
associated 1-
Year Default 
Probability 
(%) end 2001 
Moody's 
Rating 
S&P 
Rating 
Fitch 
Rating 
1 Argentina NO 63.88% 66.31% 50.00% 100.00% 1.55 – 1.68% Ca SD BB- 
2 Azerbaijan NO 5.14% 5.86%  ---  --- 1.55 - 1.68%  ---  --- BB- 
3 Belize NO 4.78%  --- 1.41% 2.63 - 3.33%  --- Ba2 BB-  --- 
4 Benin NO 52.53%  ---  --- 2.63 - 3.33%  ---  --- B+  --- 
5 Bolivia YES 12.90% 14.09% 2.00% 2.63 - 3.33%  --- B1 B+  --- 
6 Botswana NO 0.38% 2.93% 0.00% 0.00%  --- A2 A  
7 Brazil NO 13.25% 15.14% 2.00%  --- 1.55 - 1.68% B1 BB- B+ 
8 Bulgaria NO 5.82% 7.31% 2.00%  --- 1.55 - 1.68% B1 BB- B+ 
9 Chile NO 9.14% 8.61% 1.26% 0.00% 0.00 - 0.04% Baa1 A- AA- 
10 China NO 6.41% 6.15% 0.43% 0.00% 0.04 - 0.27% A3 BBB A- 
11 Colombia NO 11.72% 16.02% 1.41% 2.63% 0.27% Ba2 BB BBB 
12 Costa Rica NO 6.08% 5.06% 1.58% 2.63% 0.27 - 1.55% Ba1 BB BB+ 
13 Croatia NO 5.92% 6.22% 1.78% 0.00 - 2.63% 0.27 - 1.55% Baa3 BBB- BBB- 
14 Czech Republic NO 2.62% 3.12% 1.26% 0.00% 0.04 - 0.27% Baa1 A- BBB+ 
15 Dominican Republic NO 5.85% 5.01% 1.41% 2.63 - 3.33%  --- Ba2 BB-  --- 
16 Ecuador NO 60.95% 66.63% 33.93% 3.33 - 100%  --- Caa2 CCC+  --- 
17 Egypt, Arab Rep. NO 9.51% 9.57% 1.58% 0.00 - 2.63% 0.27 - 1.55% Ba1 BB+ BBB- 
18 El Salvador NO 7.07% 5.85%  --- 0.00 - 2.63% 0.27 - 1.55%  --- BB+ BB+ 
19 Estonia NO 3.08% 2.70%  --- 0.00% 0.04 - 0.27%  --- A- A- 
20 Fiji NO  ---  --- 1.41%  ---  --- Ba2  ---  --- 
21 Guatemala NO 6.79% 7.13% 1.41% 2.63%  --- Ba2 BB  --- 
22 Honduras YES 46.33% 58.62% 6.81%  ---  --- B2  ---  --- 
23 Hungary NO 4.51% 4.23% 0.43% 0.00% 0.04 - 0.27% A3 A- A- 
24 India NO 9.84% 10.54% 1.41% 2.63% 1.55% Ba2 BB BB 
25 Indonesia YES 66.63% 76.43% 6.86% 100.00% 1.68 - 21.97% B3 CCC B- 
26 Jamaica NO 4.88% 7.51% 1.58% 2.63 - 3.33%  --- Ba3 B+  
27 Jordan YES 36.29% 48.18% 1.58% 2.63 - 3.33%  --- Ba3 BB-   
28 Kazakhstan NO 47.48% 48.58% 1.41% 2.63% 1.55% Ba2 BB BB 
29 Latvia NO 8.26% 7.78% 0.73% 0.00% 0.27% Baa2 BBB BBB 
30 Lebanon NO 2.98%  --- 1.41% 3.33% 1.55 - 1.68% B2 B B+ 
31 Lithuania NO 5.97% 5.34% 1.58% 0.00 - 2.63% 0.27 - 1.55% Ba1 BBB- BBB- 
32 Malaysia NO 2.04% 2.23% 0.73% 0.00% 0.27% Baa2 BBB BBB 
33 Mexico YES 7.83% 6.89% 1.78% 0.00 - 2.63% 0.27 – 1.55% Baa3 BB+ BB+ 
34 Moldova YES 8.65% 9.12% 13.95%  --- 21.97% Caa1  --- CC 
35 Mongolia NO 7.10% 9.45%  --- 3.33%  ---  --- B  --- 
36 Nicaragua YES 76.25% 85.31% 6.81%  ---  --- B2  ---  --- 
37 Pakistan YES 65.88% 70.98% 13.95% 3.33 - 100%  --- Caa1 B-  --- 
38 Philippines NO 10.90% 10.61% 1.58% 0.00 - 2.63% 0.27 - 1.55% Ba1 BB+ BB+ 
39 Poland NO 7.85% 6.88% 1.26% 0.00% 0.04 - 0.27% Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
40 Romania NO 5.74% 8.04% 6.81% 3.33% 1.68% B2 B B 
41 Russian Federation YES 61.73% 55.17% 1.58% 2.63 - 3.33% 1.55 – 1.68% Ba3 B+ B+ 
42 Trinidad and Tobago NO 5.45% 4.97% 1.78% 0.00%  --- Baa3 BBB-  --- 
 --- data not available/countries not rated                 
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Annex 1: Full Model Derivation (not to be published) 
 
Consider a sovereign country i observed over T periods of time, where t = 1,….,T and i = 1,…,N. For this sovereign 
country there exists an unobservable random variable y*it indicating whether a country reschedules its sovereign debt in a 
year t. y*it is a function of lagged explanatory variables Xit, constant unobserved individual county effects α and random 
error term uit. The use of only lagged explanatory variables is for the purpose of avoiding simultaneity effects and to 
reflect direct causation. The following equation represents the above 
y*it = α + b' Xit + uit 
y*i is a dummy variable defined by 
  otherwise      0 0 if     1 ii *yy*  
b is a (k x 1) vector of parameters, and the error term uit is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean 
and unit variance, and follow a logistic distribution. αi represents the unobserved country specific characteristics.  
Moreover, the following equation represents the logistic cumulative distribution function 
)
3
exp(1
)
3
exp(
)(  
  


X
X
X  
where the mean is represented by μ and the variance by σ2. 
From the above distribution it is implied that the probability density function (PDF) of X is the following 
2))
3
exp(1(
3
)
3
exp(
)(  
  

X
X
X  
And the CDF of the standardized error term uit is therefore 
)
3
exp(1
)
3
exp(
)(
it
it
it
u
u
u 

  
 
Thus, taking our binary dependent variable (Reschedulingit) into the model, the probability of observing a rescheduling 
event in year t can be represented 
 
Prob(Reschedulingit = 1) = Prob(y*it > 0) = Prob(α + b' Xit + uit >0) = Prob(uit >- α - b' Xit) 
 
Constructing the CDF of the standard error term symmetric with the property of the logistic distribution function, we 
obtain the probability of a sovereign rescheduling in the following form 
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)exp(1
)exp()(Prob)1Prob(
it
it
ititιτ α
αα
Xβ'
Xβ'Xb'   ungRescheduli  
 
and the probability that there will be no sovereign rescheduling  
 
)exp(1
1)1Prob(1)0Prob(
it
ιτιτ α Xβ' ngReschedulingRescheduli  
where απ
3
α  and b
3
πβ   
Taking into consideration the assumption about the i.i.d. of the error term across all i and for all t and the probability of 
rescheduling and no rescheduling equations, one can derive the joint probability function for all15 observations used in 
the panel as 
   
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where α and β can be estimated through the maximization of the likelihood function and through iteration solving for the 
parameters. (e.g., Greene, 2003)  
 
Even though we are interested in obtaining the above parameters in order to analyse the significance of the determinants 
of sovereign rescheduling probabilities, we also have to consider the fact that the logit model is a binary choice-model 
that is non-linear in terms of the parameters obtained as well as the independent variables. In this manner through the 
logit model we can obtain closed-form solution for the marginal effects of the determinants. Taking the partial derivative 
of the sovereign rescheduling probability solves for the marginal impact of the determinant on the probability of 
rescheduling 
 
k
it
it
it
k,it
βα
α
2)]exp(1[
)exp()1(Prob
X Xβ'
Xβ'   ngRescheduli  
 
where Xit,k is the kth element of the Xit determinant vector, and βk is the kth element of vector β.  
 
                                                 
15
 All NxT observations 
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As we can observe by comparing the above equation with the probability density function (PDF) there is linear function 
of the logistic PDF and the coefficient of the determinant βk that defines the marginal effect of the kth determinant on the 
probability of sovereign rescheduling16. Thus, the marginal impact of all determinants of sovereign rescheduling not only 
depends on the size of the determinant itself but also on the size of all other determinants at that observation. The slopes 
of the linear function represent the marginal impact of the determinants and thus in order to evaluate them we will have 
to evaluate each slope with its respective determinant sample mean. (e.g., Greene, 2003) 
 
Therefore the core equation or the probability that a sovereign i will reschedule its debt at time t can be represented as 
follows 
 
)exp(1
)exp()1(Prob
it
it
it α
α
Xβ'
Xβ' ngRescheduli  
 
The determinants Xit that a country i will reschedule its sovereign debt can be stretched over time t or t+ 1, t+ 2, and the 
above expressions can be rewritten accordingly. The next section presents the results obtained through the panel logit 
model. 
                                                 
16
 α + β’Xit 
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Annex 2 – Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (may or may not be published) 
 
 
Table 5 reports the unrotated factor matrix that is computed in order to assist us in obtaining a preliminary 
indication for the number of factors to be extracted. The matrix contains factor loadings for each variable and 
each factor. Higher loadings make the variable more representative of the factor.  This will assist us in 
reducing the data and adequately interpreting the variables. In determining which factor loadings are 
significant we have used a cut-off point of ± 0.20 simply due to our sample size (e.g., Hair et al., 2003). 
Moreover, we have also rotated17 the factor matrix (table 6) in order to obtain a more meaningful factor 
structure and improve the interpretation of the factors. From the identification of the most significant factor 
loadings for each variable on each factor, we have determined the dimension of each of the 10 factors 
(components) which were previously indicated by latent root criterion and scree test. The columns in tables 5 
and 6 represent the 10 dimensions and the rows represent the variables contributing in each dimension (factor 
loadings). The extracted 10 dimensions are separate factors that explain the variability of the total set of 
variables, namely: 1. solvency or debt, 2. interest rates, 3. trade activity, 4. inflation, 5. credit to private sector, 
6. economic growth, 7. liquidity related to reserves, 8. 'immediacy' dimension or simply the country's ability 
to service its debt and interest due by exports, 9. short term debt and finally, 10. the last component includes 
the current account balance/GDP and the domestic savings rate.    
 
The above analysis is beneficial for determining which variables should be included in our econometric model 
as to avoid multicollinearity and over-fitting the model. Thus, from each dimension (component), we have 
selected no more than two to three variables to include in the model, which are sufficient in explaining the 
whole dimension. 
 
                                                 
17
 We have used orthogonal rotations in which the axes are maintained at 90 degrees.  
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Table 5: Unrotated Component Analysis Factor Matrix 
(Unrotated Factor Loadings) 
 Factors  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Variables 
Debt 
Related 
(Solvency) 
Dimension 
Interest 
Rates 
Trade 
Activity 
(exports-
imports) 
Dimension 
Inflation 
Credit to 
Private 
Sector 
Dimension 
GDP 
Liquidity 
Dimension 
related to 
Reserves 
Dimension 
Not 
Identified 
Short-Term 
Debt 
Dimension 
Dimension 
Not 
Identified 
Uniqueness 
l_rsch 0.38872** 0.01992 0.03309 -0.05905 0.15491 -0.06267 -0.04821 0.33495* 0.05955 0.0394 0.69638 
l_icrgrating -0.70117** -0.24142* 0.01406 0.07724 0.05203 0.25835* -0.01635 0.22077* 0.10126 0.19213 0.27828 
l_tdgnp 0.70184** -0.30939* 0.24206* -0.12608 0.37771* 0.03483 0.02777 0.17518 0.06192 -0.10126 0.1478 
l_tdexp 0.9009** -0.20428* -0.14676 -0.00859 0.01244 0.20491* 0.1473 0.02282 0.08967 -0.00549 0.0526 
l_sdtd -0.11261 -0.00232 0.30707* 0.1697 0.0532 0.32546* -0.3664* -0.26366* -0.56652** 0.13386 0.21284 
l_isexp 0.3669* 0.31797* -0.52359** -0.00284 0.34276* 0.21329* -0.06548 0.32804* -0.17805 0.24856* 0.12177 
l_pngexp -0.06065 -0.04333 -0.46391* 0.16052 0.4705** 0.40141* -0.17628 -0.32794* 0.05868 -0.32983* 0.12011 
l_ppgoexp 0.86001** -0.22527* -0.126 -0.07989 -0.0634 0.13445 0.22048 0.05803 0.1372 -0.06116 0.09074 
l_ppgexp 0.88748** -0.19602 -0.12908 -0.04363 -0.03134 0.154 0.1992 0.07261 0.11317 -0.00621 0.07289 
l_dsexp 0.31746* 0.25198* -0.58813** 0.01284 0.35508* 0.17733 -0.02872 0.30904* -0.15624 0.17123 0.18207 
l_resexp -0.34826* 0.02023 -0.00969 0.11568 -0.1942 0.5531* 0.59143** -0.12446 0.02553 0.18296 0.12179 
l_expgdp -0.36823* -0.2155* 0.6755** -0.17576 0.46255* -0.03369 0.00021 0.11658 0.1523 -0.0487 0.07652 
l_impgdp -0.1281 -0.3144* 0.6886** -0.23408* 0.46809* -0.03018 0.03309 0.20252* -0.01157 -0.1774 0.06205 
l_cargdp -0.4787* 0.29729* -0.11277 0.10295 -0.15855 -0.03239 0.03445 -0.211 0.50438** 0.24362* 0.2735 
l_iresgdp -0.35984* -0.0863 0.32852* -0.04757 -0.03089 0.50164* 0.62354** -0.10387 -0.03895 0.02471 0.09856 
l_cpsgdp -0.19169 -0.07469 -0.3191* 0.09982 0.57688** 0.32847* -0.18959 -0.36186* 0.16581 -0.35148* 0.08728 
l_gdppcg95 -0.22226* -0.08651 0.11835 -0.10324 -0.33374* 0.52046** -0.20201* 0.15453 0.02139 -0.22555* 0.42017 
l_gdpgr -0.04135 0.12337 0.18575 0.03247 -0.42449* 0.4573** -0.32602* 0.30774* 0.01451 -0.14151 0.33696 
l_expgr -0.04549 0.08128 0.18615 -0.0779 -0.33685* 0.38407** -0.31102* 0.2357* 0.18558 -0.14626 0.48151 
l_inflcons 0.11088 0.2862* 0.19665 0.87118** 0.00057 -0.04132 0.07519 0.15541 0.03295 -0.18321 0.042 
l_infldefl 0.10979 0.28311* 0.19177 0.87677** -0.00166 -0.03747 0.07467 0.15909 0.03144 -0.18272 0.03563 
l_exchdev 0.168 0.24393* 0.08712 0.78645** 0.09685 -0.15056 0.16816 0.03477 -0.00831 -0.02556 0.22393 
l_iaexp 0.74597** -0.29026* 0.17163 0.12031 -0.01235 0.25643* -0.09303 -0.15642 0.05421 0.21442* 0.16741 
l_paexp 0.83009** -0.32276* 0.1092 0.06869 -0.01899 0.24875* 0.03819 -0.09132 0.12058 0.13362 0.0857 
l_iad 0.53222** -0.17649 0.46952* 0.20617 0.03049 0.01706 -0.30619* -0.23038* -0.01627 0.28635* 0.19233 
l_pad 0.60993** -0.2614* 0.44308* 0.14214 -0.01256 -0.03604 -0.1907 -0.21652* 0.0424 0.16452 0.22956 
l_dsr -0.40826* 0.07578 0.05928 0.07821 0.41374* 0.03316 -0.16159 0.10822 0.51127** 0.36389* 0.21404 
l_gegdp -0.21063* -0.06283 0.25394* -0.08134 0.36841* 0.02817 0.44385** 0.08961 -0.23881* -0.07654 0.47615 
l_uslibor 0.08733 0.58273** 0.14215 -0.13468 0.07367 0.10944 -0.06549 -0.02285 0.21348* -0.17289 0.51678 
l_uklibor 0.27* 0.85986** 0.20073* -0.21018* 0.08417 0.04445 0.03154 -0.08896 0.008 -0.02904 0.0844 
l_imfremr 0.30084* 0.86631** 0.20712* -0.20787* 0.05998 0.04743 0.03618 -0.06086 -0.02031 0.00858 0.06155 
l_imfsdrr 0.30122* 0.86804** 0.2053* -0.20815* 0.0623 0.04702 0.03451 -0.0619 -0.02133 0.00936 0.05864 
l_iccpi 0.27771* 0.7545** 0.20999* -0.15746 -0.0127 0.09594 -0.01598 0.04343 0.01218 0.01377 0.27287 
l_oecdcpi -0.14721 -0.51127** -0.09096 0.09155 -0.06673 -0.00427 -0.07133 0.2231* 0.02091 -0.07086 0.63549 
l_logGDPPC -0.59036** 0.12194 0.05844 0.21025* 0.28452* 0.30777* -0.13841 0.12248 -0.14023 0.37542* 0.21854 
*significant factor loadings ≥ ± 0.20       
**highest significant factor loading for each variable         
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Table 6: Rotated Component Analysis Factor Matrix 
(Rotated Factor Loadings) 
 Factors  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Variables 
Debt 
Related 
(Solvency) 
Dimension 
Interest 
Rates 
Trade 
Activity 
(exports-
imports) 
Dimension 
Inflation 
Credit to 
Private 
Sector 
Dimension 
GDP 
Liquidity 
Dimension 
related to 
Reserves 
Immediacy 
Dimension 
Short-
Term Debt 
Dimension 
Current 
Account 
Related to 
Savings 
Rate Uniqueness 
l_rsch 0.31494** 0.10207 0.1733 0.04961 -0.13964 0.03532 -0.22315* 0.27405* 0.12461 0.0187 0.69638 
l_icrgrating -0.46589** -0.425* 0.18421 -0.05665 0.02298 0.2312* 0.32278* 0.09642 -0.04827 0.3422* 0.27828 
l_tdgnp 0.74692** 0.01799 0.46793* -0.01245 0.03449 -0.06312 -0.1926 0.13734 0.05081 -0.10564 0.1478 
l_tdexp 0.92701** 0.03977 -0.12876 0.0067 0.04107 -0.01905 -0.0287 0.18717 0.111 -0.14007 0.0526 
l_sdtd -0.11684 0.02396 0.07475 0.04549 0.10646 0.13537 0.06722 -0.01105 -0.84212** -0.1477 0.21284 
l_isexp 0.18729 0.22391* -0.2014* 0.00029 0.12402 -0.0486 -0.10071 0.85038** -0.00311 0.03751 0.12177 
l_pngexp 0.00742 -0.08991 -0.10477 0.01698 0.90911** -0.00379 0.0214 0.17829 -0.04176 -0.00151 0.12011 
l_ppgoexp 0.89242** 0.02581 -0.1096 -0.03363 -0.03078 -0.01265 -0.01419 0.11305 0.23229* -0.17604 0.09074 
l_ppgexp 0.9084** 0.04599 -0.11643 -0.00338 -0.03657 -0.02199 -0.01991 0.17151 0.18154 -0.14712 0.07289 
l_dsexp 0.15469 0.13985 -0.20854* 0.00316 0.18582 -0.0818 -0.09958 0.8214** 0.07153 0.00144 0.18207 
l_resexp -0.10408 -0.05518 -0.15806 0.03508 0.01623 0.06809 0.90727** -0.01742 0.00776 0.09859 0.12179 
l_expgdp -0.18651 -0.04743 0.87966** -0.06372 0.00731 -0.00665 0.06942 -0.21951* -0.06252 0.22708* 0.07652 
l_impgdp 0.01629 -0.0633 0.94951** -0.07782 -0.02639 0.01016 0.01119 -0.14394 -0.05929 -0.02973 0.06205 
l_cargdp -0.40493* 0.10377 -0.30472* 0.03078 0.04057 -0.02364 0.17103 -0.23906* 0.17925 0.58071** 0.2735 
l_iresgdp -0.08473 -0.01315 0.25205* -0.03223 0.00058 0.0514 0.89487** -0.15707 -0.02274 -0.02997 0.09856 
l_cpsgdp -0.08248 -0.08741 0.07931 -0.02066 0.9361** -0.04554 0.00144 0.05452 -0.01363 0.10021 0.08728 
l_gdppcg95 -0.08901 -0.08613 0.01338 -0.12119 0.07429 0.69466** 0.20487* -0.09827 -0.0652 -0.07526 0.42017 
l_gdpgr -0.02258 0.08394 -0.06101 0.07548 -0.10696 0.78625** 0.0433 -0.00831 -0.11712 -0.0279 0.33696 
l_expgr 0.00948 0.09422 0.00277 -0.02994 -0.04274 0.70087** 0.00013 -0.09335 -0.00465 0.08273 0.48151 
l_inflcons 0.00879 0.07968 -0.02974 0.9732** 0.00044 0.05298 -0.00211 -0.01334 -0.02396 0.00263 0.042 
l_infldefl 0.00873 0.07349 -0.03356 0.97667** 0.00115 0.05659 -0.0003 -0.00892 -0.02447 0.00223 0.03563 
l_exchdev 0.06076 0.06561 -0.08441 0.84431** -0.01162 -0.20834* 0.00428 0.04118 -0.04188 0.03281 0.22393 
l_iaexp 0.85238** -0.02486 -0.03552 0.04369 -0.01684 0.03297 -0.03461 -0.02905 -0.30535* 0.07476 0.16741 
l_paexp 0.9459** -0.0331 -0.02933 0.02893 -0.0188 0.02063 0.00356 -0.00302 -0.12537 0.01614 0.0857 
l_iad 0.57337** 0.05442 0.12189 0.15136 -0.13414 -0.03469 -0.22291* -0.21806* -0.53957* 0.17497 0.19233 
l_pad 0.66746** 0.01293 0.13623 0.11864 -0.14091 -0.05711 -0.21351* -0.28258* -0.3708* 0.07802 0.22956 
l_dsr -0.26809* -0.02981 0.25384* 0.02519 0.13861 -0.03147 -0.00574 0.114 0.0525 0.78239** 0.21404 
l_gegdp -0.14641 0.00211 0.49942** 0.02354 -0.0003 -0.25538* 0.3713 0.10125 0.02166 -0.19656 0.47615 
l_uslibor -0.04899 0.63258** 0.04275 0.0593 0.13632 0.16445 -0.04529 -0.03843 0.13338 0.09155 0.51678 
l_uklibor 0.00025 0.95305** -0.01995 0.05101 -0.01795 -0.01119 -0.02145 0.05739 0.00411 -0.00895 0.0844 
l_imfremr 0.0225 0.95959** -0.03301 0.05492 -0.06869 -0.00521 -0.01748 0.0863 -0.0165 -0.01604 0.06155 
l_imfsdrr 0.02182 0.96102** -0.03376 0.05434 -0.0669 -0.00675 -0.01918 0.08825 -0.01779 -0.01563 0.05864 
l_iccpi 0.04271 0.82493** -0.02817 0.08017 -0.11259 0.12015 -0.02352 0.09815 -0.01023 0.01297 0.27287 
l_oecdcpi 0.00052 -0.56792** 0.0918 -0.01612 -0.02293 0.15291 -0.04752 0.01868 0.07731 -0.02838 0.63549 
l_logGDPPC -0.50434** -0.08747 0.15801 0.09526 0.08711 0.08659 0.26818* 0.32054* -0.39233* 0.37647* 0.21854 
*significant factor loadings ≥ ± 0.20       
**highest significant factor loading for each variable         
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